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COMBINING SOCIAL AUTHENTICATION AND UNTRUSTED CLOUDS FOR
PRIVATE LOCATION SHARING
Andrew K. Adams, M.S.
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
With the advent of GPS-enabled smartphones, location-sharing services (LSSs) have emerged that
share data collected through those mobile devices. However, research has shown that many users
are uncomfortable with LSS operators managing their location histories, and that the ease with
which contextual data can be shared with unintended audiences can lead to regrets that sometimes
outweigh the benefits of these systems. In an effort to address these issues, we have developed
SLS: a secure location sharing system that combines location-limited channels, multi-channel key
establishment, and untrusted cloud storage to hide user locations from LSS operators while also
limiting unintended audience sharing. In addition to describing the key agreement and location-
sharing protocols used by the architecture, we discuss an iOS implementation of SLS that enables
location sharing at tunable granularity through an intuitive policy interface on the user’s mobile
device.
Keywords: Key Management; Location Tracking; Presence Systems; Privacy; Security.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, location- and presence-sharing systems have received considerable attention
from both researchers [6, 8, 21, 22, 28, 29, 35] and in practice [12, 15, 18, 20]. The recent explosion
in mobile computing and social networking has led to deployment of a wide range of location-
sharing systems (LSSs), both stand-alone in nature (e.g., Find My Friends [14], FourSquare [15],
or Glympse [18]) as well as integrated with other social networking platforms (e.g., Facebook
places [12], Google Plus [20], Twitter, or Yelp). These types of systems allow a user to share
her geographic location with her social contacts either as a first-class data object or as support for
other content (e.g., attaching one’s location to restaurant review). This sharing can be done in a
near seamless manner, particularly when the LSS is embedded within a larger social platform.
Despite their popularity, LSSs are not without their own security and privacy problems. By
their very design, these systems have the implicit shortcoming that sharing one’s location with
social contacts requires sharing this location with the LSS operator as well. This can lead to
undesirable profiling of users by third parties, or increase users’ exposure risk in the event of
an LSS compromise. In addition, it is has been shown that social networks in general [36] and
LSSs in particular [29] can sometimes lead to situations in which users experience regrets after
(over)sharing information. This is often the result of the so-called unintended audience problem,
in which data is shared with individuals other than those with whom the subject intended to share.
This may manifest as a result of a location being automatically attached to content posted on a
social network, accidental sharing of a location with a user’s entire set of contacts instead of a
restricted subset, or posting a location that contradicts other statements made by the user [29].
The latter problem is symptomatic of both LSS and access control complexity. For instance,
it is well-known that users’ social networks have many more contacts than they interact with on
a day-to-day basis: a 2011 poll of 1,954 British citizens found that the average person had 476
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Facebook friends, but only 152 contacts in their cellular phone [38]. Furthermore, research studies
have shown that users frequently make mistakes when authoring even basic access control policies
in commodity systems [5,11,30]. As such, it is clear that accidents and misconfigurations can lead
to over-sharing in large social networks. On the other hand, the problem of required sharing with
LSS operators is one of economic incentives: the ability to study user habits and carry out targeted
advertising provides revenue for operators of the systems.
An interesting observation, however, is that current generation smartphones are capable of
helping mitigate both of the above types of concerns. Given the 3G/4G connectivity of these
devices and the open APIs to cloud storage-as-a-service (SaaS) providers like Amazon S3 [2] and
Google Drive [19], it is possible for mobile applications to explicitly manage a user’s published
location history. Furthermore, smartphones store rich information about a users’ close contacts
(e.g., email addresses, phone numbers) and have access to multiple channels of communication
(e.g., WiFi, 3G/4G, Bluetooth, SMS). As a result, it is possible to develop robust key exchange
protocols—e.g., based on multiple distinct avenues of communication and historical context, or
by leveraging location-limited channels—that allow location data to be selectively encrypted prior
to upload, thereby preventing snooping attack by the SaaS provider and limiting incidences of
over-sharing.
In this thesis, we describe Secure Location Sharing (SLS), a decentralized LSS that leverages
the above observations to limit the over-exposure of user location data without relying on trusted
infrastructure. Specifically, SLS allows users to set up secure location sharing with selected con-
tacts by pairing devices in one of two ways. Users who happen to be physically co-located can use
location-limited visual channels to pair devices (similar to [24]). Users who are located apart from
one another can instead leverage multiple communication channels (e.g., email and SMS) along
with contextual question/answer protocols to help prevent man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks dur-
ing device pairing. Cryptographic keys established during this pairing process are then used to aid
in securely sharing a user’s location at a tunable granularity (e.g., GPS coordinate, city-level, etc.)
via untrusted SaaS services. In exploring SLS, we make the following contributions:
1. We demonstrate the first decentralized LSS that is capable of providing flexible and secure
location sharing over untrusted infrastructure. Unlike existing approaches to securing social
networks (e.g., X-pire! [3]), our work does not involve abuse of existing social network APIs,
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but rather builds secure and flexible sharing into the real-life social networks managed by
users’ smartphones.
2. We propose an alternate economic model for LSSs, in which the users providing their location
to others pay for the storage used to host their data.1 This removes the economic incentives
driving traditional LSS providers to view user location histories, and further reduces the risk
of accidental over-exposure due to LSS compromise.
3. SLS limits the unintended audience sharing problem by requiring explicit device pairing be-
tween providers and consumers of location sharing. By leveraging multiple channels and/or
location limited pairing protocols, this setup procedure is robust against even very strong ad-
versaries with control over large portions of the network environment.
4. We develop an iOS application as a proof-of-concept implementation of SLS. This demon-
strates both the efficiency of my approach, as well as the simplicity of interfaces needed to
manage the secure device pairing aspects of SLS.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we discuss related work, and briefly
explain the problems associated with canonical location-sharing or presence system. We discuss
the goals, properties and principals of our system in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 and 5, we present
our framework and implementation for secure location sharing. Chapter 6 re-examines the design,
evaluates the performance and security of the system, and explores directions for future work. We
present our conclusions in Chapter 7.
1Note, however, that some SaaS providers provide lower-tier service that is sufficient for SLS at little to no cost to
the user (e.g., http://aws.amazon.com/free/).
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2.0 RELATEDWORK
2.1 PRIORWORK
Google Plus [20], FourSquare [15], Facebook Places [12], and Glympse [18] are examples of LSSs
that operate by having users (i.e., providers) upload their location data to the service, such that oth-
ers (i.e., consumers) can access the location data. Current strategies for addressing privacy issues
in LSSs are typically based on obfuscating the location data or anonymizing the provider; the effi-
ciency of these techniques are discussed in, e.g., [33, 34]. In [31], the authors address oversharing
in LSSs by providing users with interactive feedback about the number of users accessing their
location, and the frequency of these accesses. This thesis deviates from prior work by (i) prevent-
ing the LSS from viewing a user’s location data, and (ii) by ensuring that a user has full control
over whom she chooses to share her location data with and how she intends for her location to be
consumed.
The protection and secrecy of a user’s data contained in the cloud is the focus of DataLocker [9],
which is a collection of tools that enable a provider to encrypt data prior to uploading the data to
the cloud. Our model does this precisely with location data, however, it is not tied to any specific
cloud entity. Moreover, we do not generically encrypt location data: policy dictates the precision
with which data is presented to the consumers, and how it is protected in the cloud. Instead of
protecting data, X-Pire! [3] attempts to decay data (ostensibly images, but the technique could be
applied to location data) by associating a key to an image; when the key expires the X-pire! aware
server refuses to serve the data. Similarly, Vanish [16] decays data by altering links to the data
stored within a DHT. Although our model does not address the decaying of data, it could benefit
from techniques like these in the future.
Several papers present advanced key management protocols that make use of smart phone
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technology [7, 13, 23, 24]. McCune et al. describe the protocol, Seeing-is-Believing (SiB) [24],
in which the camera in users’ smart phones capture 2D barcodes—these 2D barcodes are used
as commitments for exchanging public keys. Our key management protocol relies heavily on
the concepts and ideas introduced in this work. SafeSlinger [13] is a protocol and framework
designed to exchange public keys between smart phones; this is precisely one of the tasks that
our key management protocol is designed to accomplish. Similarly, Open Key Chain [27] is an
Android app used to exchange GPG keys, that uses QR codes to exchange commitment hashes.
Our work diverges from both [13] and [27] by (i) using the location-limited channel between
pairing smart phones to fully exchange asymmetric keys, and (ii) by leveraging what I refer to as
a file-store deposit (a pointer to a dropbox in the cloud) to assist in symmetric key management.
Accelerometer data from two smart phones is used in [23] and [7] to aid in authentication for secure
pairing. Mayrhofer et al. [23] employ a strategy of shaking two phone simultaneously to generate
a movement limited channel, while BUMP [7] uses the accelerometer and location data between to
bumping smart phones. Again, our work differs from pairing protocols based on movement limited
channels, by operating over location-limited and multichannel communication channels.
Multichannel security protocols, as surveyed in [37], are ways to mitigate against MitM attacks
by using multiple communication channels, e.g., radio, visual and 1-bit on/off or toggle buttons,
during authentication. The idea is that a malicious eavesdropper cannot eavesdrop on all channels.
We use an instantiation of this idea in the variant of our pairing protocol based on historical,
multiple open-lines of communication.
2.2 LIMITATIONS OF PRIORWORK
As alluded to previously, LSS have significant privacy issues, and in fact the primary issue was
exposed in [6]. In this study, it was shown that that users are uncomfortable with a service control-
ling access to their location data. Techniques have been introduced to mitigate users’ privacy issue
concerns, e.g., data can be diffused, or aggregated, but all of these reduce the utility of the data.
This is especially troubling if the providers’ intentions are for their data to be consumed at a high
precision by a specific user, or one or more groups of users. A secondary issue that arose in the
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study is that many users are uncomfortable knowing that anyone can see their location information,
i.e., once the location data is uploaded to the LSS the user forfeits control over the data.
Although not novel, the combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography can help ad-
dress both of these concerns: i.e., providers encrypt their location data prior to uploading it to a
LSS, and then must distribute the decryption key(s) to enable retrieval by authorized consumers.
However, this key management process can be a heavy burden—the most common form of cryp-
tography between Internet parties relies on a public-key infrastructure (PKI), which in turn relies
on one or more trusted-third parties (e.g., Certificate Authorities or CAs). As of today, other than
the “PGP PKI” (which utilizes a web-of-trust, as opposed to a true CA), or the “Web PKI” (which
relies on a cartel of CAs being included in the predominant web browsers used today), no PKI
exists that mobile devices can tap for the necessary key management that a privacy-enabled LSS
would require.
Interestingly, McCune et al. and Farb et al. [13, 24] observed a decade ago that smart phones
were almost ubiquitous and are exceptionally portable and, as such, are usually available during
vis-a-vis interactions. This makes smartphones an ideal platform for bootstrapping the exchange
of cryptographic keys through the location-limited channels that can exist between two parties.
We further observe that current smart phones possess the technology to perform key management
efficiently and fully over location-limited channels, but only lack the protocols and framework to
achieve this. SafeSlinger [13] is architected to rely on Internet connectivity to/from a server to
aid in the key exchange protocol (i.e., SafeSlinger only uses the location-limited channel between
the pairing smart phones for initializing the key exchange, and then for confirmation). This has
the obvious disadvantages of requiring (i) that the server be available at all times, and (ii) that
the exchange occurs in an environment that possesses network connectivity. If a user is content
to share private data with only principals within their social network, we argue that both of the
above requirements are unnecessary to exchange asymmetric keys in a close, vis-a-vis setting that
leverages location-limited channels, while using current smart phone technology.
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3.0 SYSTEM DESIGN
The SLS system was designed with two main goals in mind: (i) enabling tunable and private
location sharing with limited contacts, and (ii) limiting end-user location over exposure. We now
overview the system architecture and describe the threat model within which we expect SLS to be
used.
Internet
Cloud File Store
Provider
Consumer
Location Data
Upload
Location Data
Fetch
Multi-channel
Trust
Cellular Network
Location-limited
Trust
Figure 1: SLS Architecture Overview.
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3.1 ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
Figure 1 presents a high-level view of the SLS system. Users in the system can be divided into two
classes: providers and consumers. Providers share their location with others, while consumers re-
trieve the locations of others; a user can act as both a provider and a consumer. We assume that all
users have smartphones, as well as (perhaps self-signed) asymmetric key pairs. Providers’ smart-
phones must be able to detect their current location, e.g., via GPS or cellular/WiFi localization.
Private location sharing is enabled by shared, symmetric keys. The sharing of these symmetric
keys is facilitated by asymmetric keys exchanged during a device pairing protocol. SLS provides
two pairing protocols to exchange asymmetric keys: one based upon in-person communication
over location-limited channels, and another that leverages multi-channel communication for situa-
tions in which in-person exchange is not possible. To pair devices using location-limited channels,
users’ smartphones must have the ability to read and decode QR codes. To pair devices using mul-
tiple, historical open-lines of communication, users’ smartphones must have both Internet access
(e.g., via WiFi), as well as the ability to send and receive SMS messages over the cellular net-
work. Although the multi-channel based pairing protocol requires that principals have previously
communicated, there is no such restriction within the location-limited pairing protocol. Encrypted
location data is shared through the use of a SaaS service (e.g., Amazon S3 or Google Drive) con-
tracted by the provider. Note, although one can currently find SaaS services that are free, our
model assumes an associated cost to use the service. We require that the SaaS service allow any
user to download data posted to the provider’s account (i.e., world readable option). There is no
requirement that all providers must use the same SaaS service.
3.2 ADVERSARY MODEL
In this thesis, we make the following assumptions. We first assume that user smartphones are free
of malware, as this would immediately make user locations available to the adversary through the
smartphone API. We assume that all network communications are subject to read, replay, reorder,
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and modification by a Dolev-Yao style adversary [10]. 1 Finally, we assume that the SaaS providers
employed are honest-but-curious in nature. That is, we assume that they will correctly execute the
GET and PUT operations provided by their APIs, but may try to derive provider locations by
inspecting the data that they host. In this work, we do not address DoS/DDoS attacks against SaaS
providers as a means of thwarting location sharing.
1We alter this assumption to at most one communication channel when analyzing our pairing protocol based on
multichannel communication.
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4.0 SECURE LOCATION SHARING
We now describe the design of the Secure Location Sharing (SLS) framework. We first describe
how multiple granularities of location data are encrypted and managed by the provider (Sec-
tion 4.1). Then, we describe two protocols for pairing provider and consumer devices to enable
secure retrieval of provider locations from SaaS services (Sections 4.2–4.3). Next, we discuss
the policy controls available to providers within SLS (Section 4.4). Finally, we describe the iOS
implementation of SLS (Chapter 5).
4.1 LOCATION SHARING
In SLS, a provider’s smartphones is responsible for capturing her location data using, e.g., WiFi
or cellular localization or GPS. Each location sample collected by SLS is represented as a four-
tuple containing a location coordinate, an estimate of the provider’s speed of travel, the providers
bearing/heading, and a timestamp indicating when the sample was collected. In total, each location
sample collected by SLS requires approximately 200 bytes to store. Given that a provider may wish
to share her location at multiple granularities, the sample collected by SLS is generalized to each
desired granularity or precision prior to upload: exact, building, neighborhood, city, county, or state
precision. Where exact precision uses all available decimal places within the coordinate degrees;
building uses only four of the available decimal places; neighborhood uses three decimal places;
city uses two; county uses just the first decimal place, and state precision only uses the whole
number in the coordinate degrees [17]. These exact or generalized provider locations are shared
with consumers via an (untrusted) SaaS service contracted by the provider. As such, location data
must be cryptographically protected prior to upload. To accomplish this, the provider generates
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one symmetric key for each granularity level at which her data is to be shared (i.e., exact, building,
state, etc.), and then cipher-block-chaining (CBC) encrypts each sample prior to upload.
Encrypted location samples are thus unreadable to the SaaS service, with whom the user is
under no obligation to share her location (unlike in a traditional LSS). We note, however, that there
is economic incentive for the SaaS service to correctly house the data, regardless what the data’s
contents are, in that users are not bound to a particular SaaS service and can simply migrate their
data should the SaaS service misbehave. Providers also have complete control over the amount of
information shared: they may post only a single “current” location (e.g., by overwriting a single
location sample), or instead maintain a history of location samples (e.g., by storing a sliding win-
dow of n location samples). In SLS, we refer to these two operational modes as update and history,
respectively. Finally, consumers are under no obligation to create or maintain accounts with each
LSS that their providers use, as all data is pulled from SaaS file-stores by SLS using HTTP GET
requests made to world-readable URLs.
Of course, the reliance of SLS on symmetric keys to protect provider location data raises two
issues. First, it must be possible for providers and consumers to securely authenticate one another
and exchange the cryptographic material needed to retrieve location data at the desired level of
granularity. To this end, we present protocols for device pairing based on location-limited and
multi-channel protocols in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Second, it must be both possible and
efficient for the provider to alter the list of consumers with whom she shares information and the
granularity at which this information is shared, which are policy challenges that are addressed in
Sections 4.2 and 4.4.
4.2 LOCATION-LIMITED PAIRING
In-person, interactions are an ideal setting for device pairing and key exchange. These intimate
interactions between potential providers and consumers present the users engaging in the pairing
protocol with an opportunity to physically identify the owner of the device with which they are
attempting to establish a secure channel, as well as enable the use of location limited (e.g., vi-
sual [24] or Near Field Communication [26]) channels to exchange data, all the while presenting
11
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Figure 2: Communionable Trust Protocol.
a nigh impossible target for eavesdroppers intent on mounting MitM attacks—there simply is not
sufficient area for current technologies to intercept, much less manipulate communications. The
combination of human-to-human authentication and device-to-device communication that is dif-
ficult to intercept results in demonstrative identification [4] of the participants in location-limited
device pairing protocols. SLS utilizes the traits of visual, location-limited channels, and extends
the concepts presented in SiB [24] when pairing devices to aid in symmetric key management.
During the pairing process, asymmetric, or public keys are exchanged, which are then used to
wrap/unwrap the shared symmetric keys during transport.
We define Communionable Trust to be the confidence that an asymmetric key received through
intimate communication is bounded to the principal’s identity at the remote end of the intimate
communication channel. Note, a trusted-third party is not necessary in this definition—the recip-
ient has high confidence that the received key was given to them by the visually identified party.
12
Since our location-limited device pairing protocol is based on close, intimate communication chan-
nels, we refer to it as Communionable Trust, or simply CT. Figure 2 illustrates CT.
4.2.1 Pairing Phase
This protocol makes use of human-to-human audio and visual communication, as well as device-to-
device visual communication using on-board cameras and Quick Response (QR) codes. The first
step of this protocol is the real-world identification and authentication of the humans who wish to
pair devices to facilitate location sharing via SLS. After the human participants have agreed to pair
devices, the remainder of the protocol focuses on the exchange of public key information between
provider and consumer, and exchanging metadata that enables the sharing of both symmetric keys
and location data.
In Step 2 of the protocol, the consumer generates a QR code that contains her public key (KC)
as well as a device identity token (IDC) used to associate her device with her real-world identity,
as managed by the provider’s smartphone. The inclusion of an identity token is necessary, because
symmetric key sharing happens out-of-band from device pairing and a consumer, for example,
may choose to use an identifier for a provider which is different than how the provider identifies
themselves, e.g., John Doe vs. Johnny Doe. Thus, exchanging a hash token that represents a prin-
cipal’s identity ensures that all future communication will be associated with the correct identifier.
Figure 3 shows a QR code containing a 2048-bit RSA public key and its associated identity to-
ken.1 The provider scans this code with his phone, and recovers KC and IDC . He then generates
a random challenge nonce,NP , encrypts NP using KC , and generates a QR code containing the
resulting ciphertext (Step 3). The consumer scans this QR code, decrypts the resulting ciphertext,
and verbally communicates the nonce value to the provider (Step 4). After verifying this exchange,
the provider associates KC and IDC with the consumer’s contact information in his smartphone.
This process is then mirrored in Steps 5, 6, and 7 of the communionable trust protocol, which
provides the consumer with the providers public key (KP ) and identity token (IDP ).
In the final step of the Pairing Phase, the consumer QR-encodes their file-store deposit—a de-
scription of an out-of-band channel (e.g., type=sms, phone-number=4125551212) over
1Version 40 QR codes can encode approximately 1500 bytes of data, which is more than sufficient for exchanging
even 2048-bit public keys.
13
Figure 3: QR-encoded 2048-bit RSA public key (with associated identity token).
which the consumer wishes to be notified of the provider’s SaaS file-store—and presents it for the
provider to scan. This message is sent unencrypted due to the location-limited nature of the visual
channel used by this protocol. The use of this consumer-specified “drop box” allows the provider
to inform the consumer asynchronously (e.g., via SMS) if they change SaaS providers at a later
date, and thus obviates the need to re-execute the CT protocol.
4.2.2 File-store Deposit Phase
The final message of the communionable trust protocol handles the distribution of metadata that
enables the consumer to retrieve location samples uploaded by the provider. Asymmetric keys only
14
enable two parties to communicate securely, the SLS framework is a one-to-many infrastructure.
That is, one provider can have many consumers, and one consumer may have many providers—to
address this, SLS relies on shared or symmetric keys to map one or more consumers to a single
provider. In short, a provider uses policy to dictate which groups, or what we refer to as precision
levels, each of their consumers are assigned to (see Section 4.4).
The File-store Deposit Phase can occur anytime after the provider configures policy for the con-
sumer, i.e., the consumer is assigned a precision level sometime after the pairing phase completes
(see Figure 2). The message comprising the file-store deposit is sent over the channel identified in
Step 8 of the communionable trust protocol, and is a four-tuple of values containing a URL for the
file store at which the provider’s location data will be hosted (FS), a URL at which the consumer
can access her shared key bundle (KB), the provider’s identity token (IDP ) 2, and a timestamp
(TS) to prevent replay attacks. The entire message is then signed by the provider to ensure au-
thenticity. After using TS and KP (which is associated with IDP by the consumer) to validate
the freshness and authenticity of this message, FS and KB provide the consumer with all of the
information that is needed to securely access the provider’s location data.
The key bundle URL, KB, provides the consumer with a pointer to an encrypted key bundle
stored on the provider’s SaaS service. This key bundle is a (key, version, signature) three-tuple
that is encrypted using the consumer’s public key (KC). The key field of this tuple contains the
current symmetric key corresponding to the precision level with which the consumer is permitted to
access the provider’s location, the version field indicates the version of this key, and the signature
field is a hash of the key and version fields signed with the provider’s private key (K−1P ). Key
versions are used to facilitate location retrieval as keys change in response to changes in provider
access controls (see Section 4.4). The level of indirection added by the key bundle—as opposed to
directly transferring keys as part of the CT protocol—eliminates the need for direct communication
between the provider and consumer upon every policy change. After recovering their key bundle,
the consumer can periodically retrieve provider locations (either the current location data or the
history log, see Section 4.1) from the file store URL, FS, and decrypt this data. Note, the File-
store Deposit Phase only occurs when a consumer is initially assigned policy, or if and when the
2The identity-token is included in the file-store information to provide the consumer with a way of quickly deter-
mining which provider sent the message.
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provider changes their file-store (e.g., changing their cloud services).
4.3 MULTI-CHANNEL PAIRING
It is unreasonable to assume that users of SLS will always have the ability to physically co-locate
during the device pairing process. As such, we also describe a pairing protocol that can be used by
individuals who are not within close proximity. As such protocols can be vulnerable to MitM at-
tacks, we make use of multiple historical, open-lines of communication associated with principals
on their smart phones (e.g., email address, phone number, or instant messaging account). In this
context, historical refers to pre-existing contacts within the smartphone’s address book, and open-
lines of communication implies that the principals have communicated with the preexisting contact
over those multiple channels. This combination of properties gives providers (resp. consumers)
higher assurance that the identity of the consumer (resp. provider) is correct, since (i) existing con-
tact information is used to bootstrap the communication process and (ii) an active attacker would
need to control multiple communication channels to subvert the protocol.
Wong et al. [37] present protocols that use multiple channels of communication to mitigate
against MitM attacks during authentication or key exchange. Although the need for the multiple
channels in [37] is more to combat the relative low bandwidth of the channels possessing data
origin authenticity—the user of the receiving device knows for sure that the received data was
sent by the intended source device—the premise of the idea is sound. That is, if two distinct
communication channels are used in key exchange, the eavesdropper has a significantly harder
task in controlling the communication.
Note, the historical, open-lines of communication that a user has listed in their address book
do not possess the data origin authenticity property, unfortunately. Thus, a protocol based on his-
torical, open-lines of communication must also have strong authentication assurances, i.e., whom
the user is talking to is indeed whom the user thinks she is talking to. To address the lack of data
origin authenticity, our protocol couples the notion of using multiple communication channels with
“secret questions” to provide both parties with reasonable confidence that the principal at the re-
mote end of the multichannel communication is indeed the owner of the public key exchanged over
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Figure 4: Historical Communication Channels Protocol.
one of those channels. The Historical Communication Channels (HCC) protocol is described in
Figure 4.
HCC is initiated in the first step of the Pairing Phase by the consumer, who sends their public
key (KC) and device identity token (IDC) used to associate her device with her real-world identity
(which is established through previous contact as managed by the provider’s smartphone). This
message is sent to the provider over an existing communication channel (e.g., a known email
address), signified using a solid line in Figure 4.
Upon receiving KC and IDC , the provider generates a random challenge nonce NP , encrypts
NP using KC , and sends {NP}KC to the consumer via a different historical, open-line of commu-
nication that the provider has previously associated with the consumer in their address book (e.g.,
via SMS), which is denoted by a dashed line in Figure 4.
The consumer decrypts the ciphertext and returns NP back to the provider over HCC Sec-
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ondary (Step 3). At this point in the protocol, the provider is confident that the consumer has
access to the private key associated with the public key received in Step 1.
However, the provider does not yet have a high level of confidence that the consumer is indeed
whom the provider believes they are (e.g., someone other than the consumer could have stolen the
consumer’s smart phone). Hence, similar to the use of secrets in OTR [1], the provider generates
a secret question (QP ) that, within reason, only she and the consumer should know the answer
to; e.g., “Who was the away team at the last hockey game that we attended together?”. QP is
encrypted with KC and is sent to the consumer along with KP and IDP over the primary channel
(Step 4).3
The consumer generates (i) the answer (AP ) to QP , (ii) her own random nonce NC , and (iii)
her own secret question (QC). All three are encrypted with KP and sent to the provider via HCC
Secondary (Step 5). If, after decrypting the resulting ciphertext, AP is correct the provider sends
NC and her answer (AC) encrypted with KC via HCC Secondary (Step 6). After verifying AC ,
the consumer encrypts their file-store deposit (File-Store Deposit), NP and NC with KP and sends
them via HCC Primary (Step 7).
Finally, similar to the CT protocol, the provider assigns the consumer’s precision level and
the File-store Deposit Phase begins (see Section 4.2.2 and 4.4). If either (i) a principal receives a
secret question via SLS without first initiating or receiving a public key from the same principal
over a different channel, or (ii) the response to a participant’s secret question is incorrect, the HCC
protocol must terminate immediately.
4.4 POLICY CONTROL
As alluded to in the Section 4.2, after learning the consumer’s public key and file-store deposit
(either through CT or HCC), the provider must associate the consumer with the precision level at
which they are authorized to view the provider’s data. All consumers that are assigned the same
precision level by a provider are considered to be in the same group and, thus, all have access to a
3Although secret questions are a questionable strategy employed by some services to allow principals to bypass
potentially strong password authentication, employing them in this context—between two principals—fits the socially-
based authentication model well.
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single symmetric key protecting location disclosures made at this precision level. As a result, the
symmetric key associated with a particular precision level may need to be updated as the group of
users who have access to that precision level changes over time.
To provide the highest level of security for the provider’s location data—i.e., preserving for-
ward and backward secrecy—these shared symmetric keys should be changed whenever a con-
sumer is added to a precision group or removed from a precision group. The former case ensures
that new consumers cannot access old data, while the latter ensures that former consumers cannot
access new data. Altering the symmetric key for a particular precision level requires creating a
new symmetric key, encrypting key bundles for each user authorized at this precision level, and
depositing the bundles on the provider’s file store. After asynchronously retrieving these new key
bundles, authorized consumers can again access the providers data. While shared symmetric key
update is non-trivial, our evaluation (Section 6.1) shows that the overheads associated with this
process in practice are minimal. We note that it is not necessary for the provider to re-pair their
device with consumers via CT or HCC, as the asymmetric keys use for key management are not
affected by a consumer’s change in precision level.
We recognize that our LSS model prevents the enforcement of certain policies found in existing
LSSs; e.g., policies that enable location sharing only when two parties are within a certain physical
proximity, or policies that place access count limits on individual users. However, we observe that
LSSs that can implement proximity-based policies are able to do so because they have access to
the location data of all their users, and can thus determine the distance between two users. Since
our goal is to prevent the LSS from acquiring this omniscience, this type of policy can not easily be
enforced in SLS. Enforcing constraints on access frequency is also enabled via LSS intervention,
which is contrary to our assumed sharing model. We do note that the ability to enforce these
types of policies would be worthwhile additions to SLS. That said, we defer the exploration and
development of techniques for achieving these goals to future work.
Finally, the provider also controls how often new location updates are available to all con-
sumers, and as a metaphorical panic button, the provider can always disable future location updates
to everyone; reenabling the location updates when the provider sees fit. This, and the granularity
of precision-levels allows SLS providers to express effective policies tractably.
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION
SLS was implemented initially as an iOS 6 iPhone application and installed on an iPhone 4s. A
second implementation was developed for iOS 7 and installed on an iPhone 5s. The location-
sharing and CT pairing protocol were evaluated via the IPhone 4s, 5s and the iPhone simulator
(modified to behave as if it could scan the iPhones’ public keys).
5.1 PRECISION LEVELS
Our SLS implementation collects and stores provider locations as GPS coordinates, and provides
six precision levels at which a these locations can be shared. The precision levels supported are
exact, building, neighborhood, town, county, state, and none. Support for the building, neighbor-
hood, town, county and state sharing levels are provided by masking lower-order bits in the exact
GPS coordinates stored within SLS. For example, neighborhood precision equates to three decimal
places of precision, hence, all extra decimals places are overwritten with zeros. The precision none
implies that the consumer does not receive a symmetric key.
5.2 MANAGEMENT INTERFACE
The utility and usability of a security system’s policy interface is crucial to its successful use: the
ability to clearly indicate who can access an individual’s data and at what precision is key. We
approached this in SLS by presenting the provider with a clean, simple display that consists of
a list of principals (i.e., smartphone-managed identities associated with each consumer), and the
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Figure 5: List of Alice’s Consumers in SLS.
precision-level at which each consumer has been authorized (see Figure 5). The precision level
can trivially be changed by the provider by adjusting a slider within this interface. Additionally, a
detail view icon at the end of each row allows the provider to immediately review the consumer’s
information, resend the consumer’s shared key bundle URL, or delete the consumer.
New consumers can easily be added when the provider taps the [+] button in the upper-right
corner of the List of Consumers view (see Figure 5). This presents the provider (or the consumer,
when they navigate into their respective Add Provider screen) with a choice of either the location-
limited, CT-based key pairing protocol, or the HCC pairing protocol to exchange public keys and
the consumer’s file-store deposit.
Figure 6 shows several steps of the CT device pairing process, as executed by the provider
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and consumer. In the first step, the provider (Alice) has entered the consumer’s identity (Bob),
and Bob has done the same for Alice. When both tap the QR-code button, SLS will present both
the provider and consumer with the task list associated with device pairing in CT (Step 2). The
provider and consumer will iterate through the steps, synchronizing when QR images are printed
and scanned, or during challenge/responses—these steps have been omitted from the Figure for
clarity. In Step 7, the provider taps the button to scan the consumer’s file-store deposit as a QR
code, and Step 8 shows the consumer’s screen after displaying their file-store deposit QR code to
the provider.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 7 Step 8...
Figure 6: Screenshots of Communionable Trust protocol implemented in SLS. Steps 1, 2 and 7 are
shown for the provider, and Steps 1, 2, and 8 are shown for the consumer.
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5.3 SAAS SUPPORT
Our current implementation of SLS supports the use of Amazon’s S3 and Google Drive services as
cloud file-stores.1 The period at which SLS updates GPS coordinates and then uploads the location
data is configurable by the provider.2 For simplicity, our implementation used the iOS Core Library
API to serialize the location data that was gathered for the provider, with the resulting serialized
location objects being 1KB in size. Although these objects are larger than those that could be
produced by a custom serializer, the encryption and transmission overheads associated with these
larger objects are not significant even on the older iPhone 4s.
The cloud file-store is also used to store encrypted key bundles for the consumers associated
with a given producer. Whenever a consumer is added or a consumer’s precision level is changed,
the shared keys (for all precision-levels involved) are regenerated, new key bundles are generated
and uploaded to the provider’s file-store, and all future location samples are encrypted using the
new key. Upon detecting a key version mismatch, the consumer’s SLS application automatically
looks to fetch a new key bundle from the provider’s file-store. The new key can then be used to
decrypt more recent location updates, which may be stored in either update or history mode. To
support history mode, updates are stored in a log file referred to as the history log, which contains
an entry for each location data update in the window.3 The entries consist of the location data, time
stamp and a signature over a hash of the two components. Thus, a consumer can check the history
log to fetch any updates they may have missed, as their periodicity can be set differently than the
providers.
1An example file-store URL using Amazon’s S3 service is: https://s3.amazonaws.com/
id-precision-hash/locationdata.b64, where id-precision-hash is a hash of the provider’s
identity token and the precision level assigned to this location data.
2iOS has two settings for location gathering, the first operates using a distance filter to determine when a new
location update should occur, the second is a power-saving mode, in which a location update only occurs during a
“significant” location change. Both modes are supported in our implementation.
3Unfortunately, the current Google Drive SDK for iOS does not support appending, so our implementation was
changed to always upload a sliding window of history in the log.
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Figure 7: Consumer’s view of a provider walking up the street.
5.4 MAP VIEW
The consumer’s initial view displays their providers’ positions on a map (see Figure 7). If the
provider is operating in history mode, in which a log of location data updates is being kept in their
file-store, the consumer can view the provider’s location as a path. Since the location data stored in
the cloud also contains the bearing of the provider (in addition to the location coordinate), SLS can
plot the provider’s location using the entire history that it can obtain. This resulting view is a trail of
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footprints corresponding to the provider’s path along the map. Tapping on a provider’s footprints
displays the provider’s name and a details disclosure button, which leads to that provider’s detailed
information view.
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6.0 DISCUSSION
We developed a system for enhancing user privacy during location sharing by adopting and extend-
ing previous work in device pairing, and tapping into the ubiquity and availability of cloud services.
Our system was architected to be both scalable and secure, while also preserving providers’ shar-
ing policies and affording utility to consumers. We now discuss both the performance of our SLS
implementation, and assurance provided by our pairing protocols.
6.1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In evaluating the runtime overheads of SLS, we break our analysis into four phases: the device
pairing phase, the file-store deposit phase, location data upload by providers, and location data
download by consumers. To evaluate the communionable trust protocol (Section 4.2), we carried
out 15 pairings using our iOS implementation of SLS and found the average time required for this
process was 110 seconds. 1 Although this pairing process takes longer than, e.g., Bluetooth device
pairing, the overheads are reasonable given the human effort required by this protocol (i.e., scan-
ning QR codes). We did not evaluate the time required by the historical communication channels
protocol (Section 4.3) as this protocol was designed to be run asynchronously over multiple higher
latency channels (e.g., email and SMS).
After devices are paired using either the CT or HCC protocol, in the file-store deposit phase the
provider sends the consumer a digitally signed message that includes URLs that are to be used to
retrieve the consumer’s key bundle and the provider’s location data. This data can only be sent after
1The simulator was faster at several things, e.g., typing in the user’s identity, however, since the protocol was
lock-step, the average times should still be within reason.
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the provider has indicated the precision level with which the consumer may access his information,
and is returned to the consumer over a communication channel identified in the final message of
the pairing phase of the CT or HCC protocol (i.e., the file-store deposit message). The overhead
associated with this phase is linear in the number of consumers, but is only a one time cost, as this
only occurs once per consumer (or in the wake of the rare event of the provider changing cloud
services). In our iOS implementation of SLS, the generation of the signature on this message took
98ms on average over 15 runs.
A consumer that is tracking n providers must execute O(n) operations, as they must retrieve
n encrypted location samples from up to n different SaaS providers. The frequency with which
this process occurs is a parameter that can be set per-provider within my implementation by the
consumer—the linear cost could be applied once per day, or once every five seconds (if they so
choose). We measured the average time required to execute the HTTP GET command required
to obtain a provider’s encrypted location sample and execute the symmetric key decryption of this
sample. When using Amazon S3 as SaaS provider, this process took approximately 40ms per
provider, where the RTT of the fetch was 35ms. Thus, the consumer’s performance is governed by
the choice of cloud service each of its n providers use and if the RTT was dominated by network
latency, the consumer’s current network path to those file-stores. 2
On the other hand, the cost incurred by the provider during uploads is constant: a symmetri-
cally encrypted GPS gathered location sample must be uploaded (e.g., HTTP PUT) at each of the
p precision levels used by the provider’s policy. The provider can choose the periodicity that new
GPS coordinates are produced, so the constant time cost can be applied once per day, or several
times per minute (depending on how fast the smart phone is moving and how fast it can generate
new GPS coordinates). In our iOS implementation, encrypting and uploading location samples at
three precision levels over 15 runs took on average, 3.7s, with a standard deviation of 1.8s. Al-
though we were unable to isolate the poorly behaving components, we suspect that the majority of
time was spent blocking on our cloud provider’s API.
2It is conceivable that the RTT may have been more dependent on the file-store’s API or infrastructure, then network
latency.
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6.2 SECURITY ANALYSIS
The SLS system was designed with two main goals in mind: (i) enabling tunable and private
location sharing with limited contacts, and (ii) minimizing end-user location over exposure. This
is achieved by storing encrypted (AES-256-CBC) location samples on SaaS servers contracted by
the provider, and leveraging location-limited or multi-channel pairing protocols on smartphones to
facilitate the key management required by this approach. We now informally analyze the security
afforded by the protocols developed in this paper.
6.2.1 Location-limited Pairing Protocol
The communionable trust protocol described in Section 4.2 provides principals with high assur-
ance regarding the secure handling of location data. In particular, the face-to-face nature of this
protocol allows the human device owners to authenticate each other in the most natural sense. As
a result, the public keys exchanged and validated using this protocol are intrinsically tied to the
real-world participants in the protocol, since anyone attempting to launch a MitM attack would be
quite conspicuous—we refer the reader to the security analysis in [24] for a thorough examination
of attacks against this type of channel, as well as comparisons against other channels (e.g., audio,
infrared, physical contact, etc.). For this reason, the principal’s public key and identity exchanged
via CT are made available to other applications outside of SLS. 3 Assuming that the consumer
keeps her private key a secret, the public key obtained during this process enables the provider to
safely transmit symmetric keys needed to recover her location to the consumer without exposing
her location to unauthorized individuals (including the SaaS provider).
6.2.2 Multi-Channel Pairing Protocol
In settings where the provider and consumer are not physically located together, obtaining the same
assurance level from the communionable trust protocol is difficult. The protocol in Section 4.3
attempts to overcome the lack of physical proximity in three ways. First, it leverages historical
communication channels managed by each user’s smartphone to increase assurance in the identity
3iOS provides for this by using a shared or public attribute group within its key-chain.
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of the party being communicated with, thereby reducing the likelihood of accidental sharing with
inappropriate parties. Second, the HCC protocol makes use of multiple communication channels
to decrease the likelihood of a successful MitM attack against the protocol. In examining Figure 4,
one can see that an adversary with access to only the e-mail channel has the ability to inject public
keys into the protocol, but cannot complete the validation process for these keys. Likewise, an
adversary with access to only the SMS channel can cause parties in the protocol to reject valid
public keys, but cannot inject their own public keys.
While this protocol cannot protect against a MitM attack when the adversary has access to both
channels used by the protocol, as long as the implementation ensures that both channels are indeed
distinct (e.g., WiFi + SMS, as opposed to 3G/4G + SMS) the cost to mount such an attack would
be prohibitive to most. A more realistic attack vector against cell phones would be a physical
attack, i.e., the attacker steals the smartphone of the consumer (resp. provider). However, the third
protection mechanism in HCC does allow it to protect against this attack. Specifically, each party
is required to answer a contextual “secret question” (i.e., QP and QC in Figure 4) proposed by
the other party prior to finalizing the pairing process and enabling location sharing. Unless the
individual possessing the stolen smartphone has intimate knowledge of the relationship between
the provider and consumer, they would be unable to answer this type of question and, thus, the
protocol would fail.
Although this question-and-answer mechanism is useful, it is not perfect. First, HCC requires
seven messages and the cognitive power to generate and answer two “secret questions”. Upon
closer examination, though, this apparent disadvantage is not that significant; the HCC phase only
occurs once for a provider/consumer pair. Moreover, each message would arrive as an SLS URL,
so the user would only need to click on it, as the app woud do the work and only when necessary,
prompt the user to enter or answer a secret question. Imagine how long it takes to send a total
of seven SMS messages in one conversation—not very long. However, the protocol requires that
the implementation leverage distinct communication channels, the mechanisms used to ensure the
channels are distinct could themselves be attacked, i.e., an attacker could try to trick the imple-
mentation to use multiple channels that he controls. For this reason, we encourage principals to
upgrade their public keys exchanged via HCC with CT, whenever the opportunity presents itself. 4
4SLS accommodates the weaker assurance in HCC by flagging public keys exchanged via HCC and limiting the
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6.2.3 Shared Key Management
The shared or symmetric key management scheme employed by SLS provides three assurances to
its users, including: the assurance that only a provider can upload new key material to the cloud
file-store, the assurance that the location data can not be accessed by anyone without the appro-
priate shared key, and the assurance that exposure of the identities of the provider’s consumers is
mitigated within the cloud file-store. The first assurance is ensured by the act of encrypting the
shared key bundle with the consumer’s public key, while including a version and signature, i.e., an
adversary can not alter the contents of the bundle as it is signed. The adversary could replay (or
overwrite) an older shared key bundle, however, as the version of the key is included in the bundle
the consumer will know that the current shared key bundle is incorrect.
Since the shared key bundles are encrypted with the consumers’ public keys, and the uploaded
location data is encrypted with the shared keys contained within those bundles, the provider is
assured that only those consumers possessing the appropriate shared key will be able to view the
provider’s location data. Granted, a consumer could make the symmetric key accessible to non-
authorized users, however, we note that this is the bane of all shared key security systems, and its
mitigation is outside the scope of this thesis.
Finally, exposure of the consumers’ identities is mitigated through the use of the file-store
deposit. Specifically, the provider can use any unique token to identify a consumer’s shared key
bundle, as the location of the shared key bundle is delivered to the consumer out-of-band via the
file-store deposit. Admittedly, the cloud service will know how many consumer a provider has,
and possibly how many precision levels are in use by the provider (by examining the contents of
the history log, if in use). Thus, in order for the cloud service to uniquely identify a consumer,
they’ll have to rely on properties of the HTTP connection during the fetch (e.g., IP address, HTTP
message headers).
access to those keys by external applications.
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6.3 BEYOND LOCATION SHARING
Interestingly, although our system was designed to share location data, there is no reason that
the protocols and framework constituting SLS could not be adopted for other types of private
data sharing (e.g., documents, pictures, music, or videos). That being said, we do not envision
these SLS-like services replacing forums like Flickr or YouTube, which have proven to be de-
facto file-stores for widely sharing information. However, these SLS-like services could be useful
for providing secure and private hosting for information that is to be shared with a more limited
audience.
6.4 FUTUREWORK
The most pertinent area of future work involves conducting a user study to assess the utility and
ease-of-use of our SLS implementation. Although the focus of this thesis was on the correctness
and feasibility of the system, ensuring that SLS is indeed usable is also quite important. A user
study of our prototype iOS and a yet undeveloped Android implementation could help answer
questions about the usability of the policy interface built into the application, as well as about the
ability of users to manage their privacy using SLS’s management interface. Insights from exit sur-
veys conducted with participants in such a study could also help guide the design of more intuitive
sharing interfaces, and protections that might help further limit unintended audience sharing (e.g.,
short-term sharing settings, etc.).
Another area that we intend to pursue is the development of more advanced and cooperative
policy controls. As previously discussed in Section 4.4, adding some form of cooperative pol-
icy controls could prove invaluable. For example, consider a provider that only feels comfortable
sharing her location data with consumers in the same region. We envision that this could be accom-
plished if the pair had mutual sharing configured between them (i.e., both acted as providers and
consumers), and secure function evaluation or a protocol based on Narayanan et al. private prox-
imity testing [25] was leveraged to decide when the distance between the two principals crossed
some threshold (at which point SLS would operate normally). Although such advanced controls
31
are likely possible, making these controls both intuitive for the user and efficient for the device to
execute could prove to be challenging in practice.
Similarly, an intriguing extension of SLS’s key management protocols would be to implement
key escrow support for emergency response. Specifically, the symmetric key used in encrypting
high-precision location data could not only be encrypted with the consumers’ public keys, but
also broken into shares, to be distributed to emergency respondents using a threshold scheme
(e.g., [32]). For example, consider a 2-of-n threshold scheme in which key shares are distributed
to the local police force for the provider’s municipality, the state police, and the security contractor
used by the provider’s employer. In this case, for instance, the provider’s employer could cooperate
with the local authorities in the event that the provider was missing long enough for the employer
to file a missing persons report. Further developing these sorts of policy-based extensions to SLS
could prove to be an interesting area of study.
A mechanism for transitive trust would allow a user’s PKI to grown along its social network—
Safeslinger [13] introduced an interesting feature that resembles a type of a “friend of a friend”
bootstrapping process for its key exchange. Although we would need to be very careful leveraging
any sort of a “friend of a friend” attribute, the notion is compelling. Presumably, any mechanism
to initialize our key management protocol through using this attribute would operate over HCC, so
this utility would be held to the same controlled assurances as HCC.
Moreover, HCC may be further enhanced by pursuing a means to protect the answers to secret
question. This could be realized by employing a zero-knowledge proof; Alexander and Goldberg
[1] introduce the idea of using zero-knowledge proofs in the OTR protocol to see if both parties
agree on a secret, without divulging what that secret is. Although it may prove to be only a marginal
improvement, SLS’s privacy assurances could benefit by adopting a similar approach.
Finally, as alluded to in Section 6.3, SLS’s framework could be modularized to support sharing
any form of private data. Specifically, the code for both pairing protocols should be extracted into
a separate app designed to be used opportunistically by users. Furthermore, the file-deposit phase
and the cloud file-store operations could easily be repackaged as a library. With the key-exchange
pairing app devoted to building a PKI in the smartphone’s key-chain, and the above mentioned
library, any app could leverage the same framework SLS enjoys.
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS
Location-sharing systems (LSSs) have high utility, but research has shown that (i) many users are
wary of sharing detailed trace information with LSS operators and (ii) the large social networks
with which LSSs are often integrated make it all too easy to accidentally share location data with
unintended audiences. In this thesis, we make inroads to the above problems by developing SLS,
a framework for private location sharing that combines the use of social authentication protocols
based upon location-limited or multi-channel protocols, with user-contracted cloud SaaS providers
to facilitate secure data storage and location sharing. In particular, our device pairing protocols
leverage the smaller social networks managed by user smartphones to provide a high degree of
assurance in the identities of the individuals with which sharing is to occur. The asymmetric keys
exchanged during this process can then be used to distributed shared symmetric keys that protect a
location provider’s sensitive location information from unauthorized viewers, including the cloud
service used to host the data. Our iOS prototype implementation of SLS shows that the overheads
associated with this form of key management are reasonable.
Although the information sharing model developed in this thesis was developed to facilitate
secure location sharing based upon an individual’s limited, real-world social contacts, we believe
that my techniques have application beyond location sharing. In particular, the combination of
device pairing with high identity assurance and third-party storage that is used by SLS’s framework
can be used to facilitate the sharing of many types of information currently shared using existing
social networks (e.g., photos, etc.) without requiring implicit trust in the operators of these social
networks.
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